报告题目：“Mix and match”:product compatibility without network externalities
报 告 人：陈伟琼（产业组织与企业组织研究中心硕士研究生）
报告时间：2024年11月15日（周五）10:00-11:30
报告地点：问源阁419室
主办单位：产业组织与企业组织研究中心
【内容摘要】
In industries where consumers can assemble their own systems, firms must decide whether to make their components compatible with those of their rivals. We examine a two-stage game in which two fully integrated firms make their compatibility decisions before competing in prices. The symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is shown to involve full compatibility. Although compatibility leads to higher prices than incompatibility, it also increases the variety of systems available so that some consumers are better off with compatibility, while others are hurt. If standardization is costless, compatibility increases social surplus, but may decrease consumer surplus.
【文章信息】
Matutes C, Regibeau P. " Mix and match": product compatibility without network externalities[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988: 221-234.
【文章链接】
