报告题目：Optimal Licensing: from Three to Two Part Tariff
报告时间：2022年4月11日（周一）15:00 - 16:30
报告地点：腾讯会议（会议号：434 320 535）
马思宇，中国政法大学商学院产业经济系讲师，2017年获美国纽约州立大学石溪分校（Stony Brook University）经济学博士，曾任以色列跨学科中心创业学院研究员和特拉维夫大学数学科学学院博士后研究员。主要研究领域为博弈论、产业经济学和微观经济学，研究成果发表在Review of Industrial Organization和Journal of Public Economic Theory。
This paper considers the licensing of a cost reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly with licensing policies that are combinations of three instruments: per unit royalties, ad valorem or revenue royalties and upfront fees. The key insight is that per unit royalties have a location effect and ad valorem royalties have a scale effect on marginal costs. Using these two effects, it is shown that the same market outcome (price, quantities, operating profits) can be sustained by multiple combinations of per unit and ad valorem royalties. In general, there is a unique optimal three part tariff only if it is a pure upfront fee; otherwise, there is always a continuum of optimal policies, in which case there always exists an optimal three part tariff that consists of a positive per unit royalty and upfront fee but no ad valorem royalty. There may also exist optimal policies consisting of only two of three instruments (two kinds of royalties with no upfront fees or ad valorem royalties and fees with no unit royalty).