报告题目：Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the  Construction Industry

报告人：罗耀

报告时间：2022年3月26日（周六）9:30-11:00 （北京时间）

          2022年3月25日（周五）21:30-23:00 （美东时间）

报告地点：腾讯会议（会议号：390 756 431）

主办单位：产业组织与企业组织研究中心

【报告人简介】

罗耀，加拿大多伦多大学（University of Toronto）Arts & Science学院经济系副教授，2013年获美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学（Pennsylvania State University）经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为实证产业组织（Empirical Industrial Organization）和应用微观计量经济学（Applied Microeconometrics），研究成果发表在Journal of Political Economy, International Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Econometrics, Review of Economics and Statistics和Journal of Business Economics & Statistics等国际权威经济学期刊。

【报告摘要】

We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US construction industry by estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers. To obtain a comprehensive measure of the total rents and to understand its sources, we take into account that rents may arise due to markdown of wages in the labor market, or markup of prices in the product market, or both. Our analyses combine the universe of US business and worker tax records with newly collected records from US procurement auctions. We use this data to identify and estimate a model where construction firms compete with one another for projects in the product market and for workers in the labor market. The firms may participate both in the private market and in government projects procured through auctions. We find evidence of considerable wage- and price-setting power. This imperfect competition creates sizable rents, three-fourths of which is captured by the firms. The incentives of firms to mark down wages and reduce employment due to wage-setting power are attenuated by their price-setting power in the product market.

报告文章链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w27325