主讲人：李睿晖（产业组织与企业组织研究中心硕士研究生）
题目：Export subsidies and international market share rivalry
时间：2023年11月17日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点：问源阁419室
内容摘要：
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, with imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibrium involves such subsidies by producing nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal.
文章信息：
Brander, J. A., & Spencer, B. J. (1985). Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. Journal of International Economics, 18(1-2), 83-100.
文章链接：
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(85)90006-6
